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Gender revolution, evolution or neverlution? 
Lynn Prince Cooke (University of Bath) 
In the 1960s, second-wave feminists1 heralded a gender revolution. Women demanded control 
over their reproduction and sought full, equal participation in public economic and political life. To 
support this, women began to expect men to be emotionally ‘involved fathers’ rather than just 
breadwinners, and to share the unpaid domestic work (Lewis, 1984). As with most revolutions, 
this one sprang from struggles that began earlier as British women in the 19th and early 20th 
centuries sought equality in education,2 marital property,3 and voting rights.4 Critical measures of 
the revolution’s success entail equal economic and political power. This includes minimising 
gender and particularly parental gaps in employment, earnings, time spent in housework and 
childcare, and political representation. Both precursor and consequent to women’s greater 
economic and political power is reducing women’s greater risk of domestic abuse,5 sexual 
harassment6 and global exploitation.7   
The revolution may have been proclaimed in the 1960s, but progress toward gender equality 
unfolds intergenerationally. Recent comparative research (Cunningham, 2001) shows that 
daughters of employed mothers are more likely to work and employed mothers’ sons are more 
likely to care for family members. Sons of fathers who do housework also do more housework 
(Cunningham, 2001). The changes coincide with shifting generational attitudes about women’s 
and men’s ‘proper’ roles in society. Not all countries equally embrace the changes, however. A 
comparative study in the late 1990s found that the generational pace of attitudinal change was 
slower in Britain than other countries because of concerns that maternal employment hurts 
children (Scott, Alwin and Braun, 1996). A 2013 study finds that only 13% of British people still 
support traditional gender roles, but one-third also believe that a mother should stay home when 
children are younger than school age (Park et al., 2013). Based on my own calculations, however, 
the percentage of UK respondents supporting mothers staying at home is on par with the 
average of all 41 countries in the 2012 International Social Survey Programme (ISSP Research 
Group, 2016).  
Gender attitudes are interwoven with cultural definitions of femininity and masculinity. 
Psychologist Sandra Bem (1974) developed a sex role inventory in the 1970s of personality traits 
that both male and female college students at the time rated as being more desirable for one sex 
than the other. Stereotypical masculine traits on the scale depict assertiveness and 
instrumentality, whereas stereotypical feminine traits depict nurturance and expressiveness. 
Stereotypes are not just descriptive, they are prescriptive. Children are exposed to and judged by 
these stereotypes from birth in daily social interactions, nudging their behaviour in socially 
1  See https://www.bbc.co.uk/archive/second-wave-feminism/zdhw382. 
2  See ‘A History of Women’s Education in the UK’ on the Oxford Royale Academy website, https://www.oxford-
royale.com/articles/history-womens-education-uk/#aId=a7834b45-8be0-41da-8252-70e9d9684256. 
3  See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Married_Women%27s_Property_Act_1882.  
4  See https://www.parliament.uk/about/living-heritage/transformingsociety/electionsvoting/womenvote/.  
5  See https://www.womensaid.org.uk/information-support/what-is-domestic-abuse/how-common-is-domestic-
abuse/. 
6  See https://www.citizensadvice.org.uk/law-and-courts/discrimination/what-are-the-different-types-of-
discrimination/sexual-harassment/. 
7  See https://www.antislavery.org/slavery-today/human-trafficking/.  
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normative ways. Stereotypes are further reinforced in textbooks,8 advertising (Grau and Zotos, 
2016) and wider media (Ward and Grower, 2020).  
Yet the gender stereotypes have begun to change across generations, albeit in a one-sided 
fashion. One US meta-analysis reveals that women’s identification with historically masculine-
typed personality traits increased sharply between 1973 and 1994, an increase mirrored among 
men to a lesser extent (Twenge, 1997). In contrast, the increase in men’s identification with 
feminine-typed traits across the period was minimal. This cultural asymmetry – where it is more 
acceptable for women to act like men than vice versa – is evident in other ways. For example, no 
one comments now when a woman wears trousers, but Harry Styles’ dress9 on the December 
2020 cover of Vogue made news headlines and caused an outcry from some commentators.  
An evolution? 
The slow, intergenerational, slightly lop-sided unfolding of social change indicates that the term 
gender ‘evolution’ is more apt than ‘revolution’. One group of Oxford researchers calculated that 
if the progress since the 1960s continued at the same pace, gender convergence would be 
achieved in another 70 to 80 years (Yee, Sullivan and Gershuny, 2011). Unfortunately, progress 
along many of the success measures outlined above plateaued, raising doubts that even an 
evolution continues.  
For example, the IFS Deaton Review chapter on gender by Andrew, Bandiera, Costa Dias and 
Landais, which this commentary accompanies, notes that young women in the UK are now more 
likely than young men to complete both secondary schooling and university (Andrew et al., 2021). 
Yet data from the Higher Education Statistics Agency10 reveal that women in the UK remain far 
less likely than men to study programmes such as computer science and engineering, whereas 
the percentage of men is lowest and continues to decrease in education, languages and nursing. 
A review by Buchmann, DiPrete and McDaniel (2008) finds that such stark gender inequalities in 
academic subjects cannot be attributed to sex differences in cognition but are common across 
countries.  
The gender disparities in fields of study contribute to persistent gender inequalities in 
employment and earnings. According to research conducted by the IFS (Roantree and Vira, 
2018), the UK gender employment gap narrowed as the employment rate for adult women 
increased from 57% in 1975 to 78% in 2017, with a notable increase in women’s full-time 
employment. The ONS reports that the participation rate for men in the UK11 remained higher 
until the last few years. Despite the narrowing of the gender employment gap and the increase in 
women’s full-time employment, employed women in the UK are still more likely than men to work 
part-time (Devine, Foley and Ward, 2021). Women in the UK therefore accrue less total work 
experience over adulthood than men, which contributes to the 15.5% average gender pay gap 
(ONS, 2020). According to a 2018 analysis by the European Commission (Boll and Lagemann, 
2018), the UK gender wage gap is among the largest in Europe. Women’s disadvantage 
accumulates over the life course. Their lesser work experience and wages contribute to women’s 
over-representation among poor pensioners in most OECD countries (Haitz, 2015). 
 
 
8  See https://gemreportunesco.wpcomstaging.com/2016/03/08/gender-bias-is-rife-in-textbooks/. 
9  See https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2020/nov/16/harry-styles-vogue-cover-dress. 
10  See https://www.hesa.ac.uk/news/17-01-2019/sb252-higher-education-student-statistics/subjects. 
11  See https://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peopleinwork/employmentandemployeetypes/ 
timeseries/ mgsv/lms .  
Cooke, L. P. (2021), ‘Gender revolution, evolution or neverlution?’, IFS Deaton Review of Inequalities 
3  © Institute for Fiscal Studies, December 2021 
One frequently mentioned contributor to the gender wage gap is occupational gender 
segregation, with occupations dominated by women often paying less than those dominated by 
men (Brynin and Perales, 2016). Yet the relationship between occupational segregation and 
earnings is more complex. For example, Jarman, Blackburn and Racko (2012) illustrate that 
although gender occupational segregation is high in the Nordic countries of Denmark, Finland 
and Sweden, the gender pay gap in these countries is smaller than in the UK. In contrast, Japan 
has the lowest level of gender occupational segregation but the largest gender wage gap.  
A more consistent finding across countries is that employed women face ‘glass ceilings’ that 
exclude them from the highest-paying occupations. A 2017 report by Grant Thornton12 found that 
about one-quarter of UK senior managers are women, a proportion that has not changed over 
the past decade. This is a shared problem throughout the European Union,13 despite the evidence 
that women are often rated better than men on key leadership characteristics (Zenger and 
Folkman, 2019). More recently, though, the proportion of women on top UK boards has increased 
to one-third.14 Research from Canada reveals that women also face ‘glass doors’ because they 
are less likely to be employed in the highest-paying firms (Javdani, 2015). Glass ceilings and glass 
doors are further reasons why the Deaton Review chapter by Andrew et al. accompanying this 
commentary shows that UK gender wage gaps have not narrowed appreciably over the past 30 
years, once controlling for women’s educational gains.  
People debate how much these gender employment differences stem from individual choice or 
gender discrimination. Gender choices may be socially reinforced from birth, but discrimination 
is illegal. The clearest measure of gender discrimination is if women earn less than men when 
working in the same job and workplace. Estimating this requires information on workers nested 
in employers and is available for only a handful of countries. One international research group 
hosted by the University of Massachusetts-Amherst15 reports that in the 15 countries for which 
such data are available, significant gender wage gaps in occupation–workplace units range from 
6% in the Netherlands to 28.4% in Japan. Similar data have not yet been made available for 
analysis in the UK, but its occupation–workplace gender wage gap likely approximates the 12% to 
14% wage gap found for Canada and the US. If this were the case, then the UK’s 15.5% gender pay 
gap cannot be explained away because women and men choose different jobs.16   
Progress in the unpaid work of the domestic sphere is slower still. Analyses of trends in time use 
indicate that UK women’s total domestic time decreased 24 minutes per day between the early 
1970s and early 2000s, from 304 minutes to 280 minutes (Kan, Sullivan and Gershuny, 2011). The 
increase in UK men’s daily domestic time across the period was nearly twice as large, but from 
such a low base that women still did twice as much as men. Things have not progressed in the 
new millennium. Data from the 2014–15 Time Use Survey indicate that UK mothers still do twice as 
much daily housework and childcare as fathers (Hupkau and Petrongolo, 2020). Analyses of time 
diary data for other countries confirm that these proportions are not unique to the UK, however; 
what varies more across countries is the total time women and men spend doing domestic tasks 
(Kan et al., 2011).  
 
 
12  See https://www.consultancy.uk/news/13181/women-remain-underrepresented-in-senior-and-strategic-
management. 
13  See https://ec.europa.eu/info/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/gender-equality/gender-equality-strategy_en. 
14  See https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-56172775. 
15  See the web page for the Comparative Organizational Inequality Network (COIN), The Organizational Production of 
Earnings Inequalities: A Ten Nation Comparison using Linked Employer–Employee Panel Data, 
https://www.umass.edu/coin/papers.html. 
16  See https://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peopleinwork/earningsandworkinghours/bulletins/ 
genderpaygapintheuk/2020. 
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Progress also plateaued in UK women’s political representation. According to a 2018 report by 
the British Council,17 women comprise about one-third of House of Commons MPs and a similar 
proportion of local authority councillors. On the international stage, these stubbornly low gender 
representational statistics mean the UK has fallen from 25th in the world in 1999, to 39th in 2020, 
according to IPU Parline.18 In Europe, the percentage of women in lower or single national 
parliaments is higher in Austria, Belgium, France, Iceland, Italy, the Nordic countries, Portugal, 
Spain and Switzerland. In the UK, women’s representation in the larger House of Lords is lower 
still at less than 27%, similar to the percentage in the upper chambers of Belarus and Cameroon. 
A neverlution 
The underwhelming UK and global progress toward gender equality in educational subjects, 
employment, earnings, divisions of household labour, attitudes, and political representation 
points to a ‘neverlution’ rather than either a revolution or evolution. So, what keeps full gender 
equality at bay? It is a combination of fragile institutional support structures and socio-economic 
forces that sustain intersecting group hierarchies.  
The fragility of the UK support structures for gender equalities outside or inside the home was 
laid bare by the COVID-19 pandemic. How adverse the impact of COVID-19 has been on women’s 
employment depends on their parental status. One study (Hupkau and Petrongolo, 2020) by the 
London School of Economics (LSE) found that UK women in general are not only more likely to 
work in sectors such as hospitality that are subject to lockdown (19% women, 13% men), but also 
more likely to work in critical sectors such as health services (46% women versus 39% of men). 
In addition, more women than men are in jobs such as administration that can be done from 
home (24% versus 19%).  
As a result of these competing factors, the LSE study concluded that UK job losses associated 
with the COVID-19 pandemic and furloughing have been evenly distributed between the two 
genders. When focusing on parents, though, in their IFS report, Andrew et al. (2020) found 
greater gender disparities. Mothers were slightly more likely to be furloughed than fathers (35% 
versus 30%), and more likely to have permanently lost a job they held in February 2020 (17% of 
mothers versus 11% of fathers). Despite these differences, both studies found no significant 
gender differences in the loss of earnings (although in the context of a persistent gender wage 
gap). 
The closure of care centres during the first lockdown carries longer-term gendered employment 
repercussions. In another report by the IFS, Blanden et al. (2020) found that although the 
government offered support to both publicly and privately funded care providers, the drop in 
demand from increased home working could lead to a contraction in care provision after the 
pandemic. The Fawcett Society Equal Pay Day 2020 report notes a contraction will likely increase 
the already very high cost of private care in the UK compared with the rest of Europe (Fawcett 
Society, 2020). In addition, a contraction would reduce the available employment opportunities 
for lower-skilled women.  
The impact of care centre and school closures is arguably even greater within parent 
households. According to an IFS report on time use (Andrew et al., 2020), childcare was the most 
 
 
17  Women, Power and Politics in the UK: What’s changed in 100 years?, https://www.britishcouncil.org/society/womens-
and-girls-empowerment/research-reports/women-power-politics-100. 
18  See the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) monthly ranking of women in national parliaments, 
https://data.ipu.org/women-ranking?month=10&year=2020. 
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frequently reported activity by both parents throughout the day during lockdown. Still, mothers 
spent more time with children. In every hour between 8am and 6pm, around 70% of mothers and 
50% of fathers were doing childcare. Mothers were also more likely than fathers to multitask 
childcare and paid work (45% of mothers versus 26% of fathers). As a result of the distractions, 
almost half of employed UK women are worried that the pandemic has negatively affected their 
future job and promotion prospects, according to the Fawcett Society (2020).   
Within the home, Hupkau and Petrongolo (2020) found that men as well as women increased 
their housework and childcare time during lockdown, compared with 2014–15. Among partnered 
individuals, the amount of time spent by women in the UK on housework in the pandemic 
increased by two hours to 16 hours per week, whereas men’s housework increased by 3.5 hours 
to 10 hours per week. Both parents spent more time in childcare. Mothers’ lockdown childcare 
rose to 26.5 hours per week (from 17 in 2014–15), and fathers to almost 15 hours per week (from 
just under eight hours in 2014–15).  
These trends confirm that when the UK’s institutional supports for care work crumbled in the 
pandemic, partnered fathers in the UK stepped up by increasing their share of childcare from 
32% to 36%. Nevertheless, the total division of unpaid work remains gendered in couple 
households. In addition, single mothers (who head about 15% of UK families19) carry any extra 
burden of housework and childcare alone.  
Physical oppression 
A darker trend in the home is domestic violence. Home Office statistics20 for the year prior to the 
pandemic highlight that men are twice as likely as women to be victims of homicide, but almost 
half of female victims are killed by a partner or ex-partner, compared with only 8% of the male 
victims. The isolation and frustrations of pandemic lockdowns increase the risk of domestic 
violence. During the first three months of the first lockdown, calls to the National Domestic Abuse 
hotline surged to 40,000.21 The upward trend continued in subsequent lockdowns, with the BBC 
reporting there were more than 131,000 calls between April 2020 and February 2021.22 The 
Guardian noted that UK police recorded more than 250,000 domestic abuse cases between April 
and June 2020, an increase of 7% compared with the same period in 2019.23 Despite the increase 
in UK domestic violence during the first lockdown, referrals of suspects from the police to the 
Crown Prosecution Service fell 19%. The increase in domestic violence during the pandemic is not 
confined to the UK. The United Nations (UN) has released emergency funds to grassroots 
organisations to address what it sees as a global ‘shadow pandemic’.24 Worldwide, the UN 
 
 
19  See https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/birthsdeathsandmarriages/families/bulletins/ 
familiesandhouseholds/2019. 
20  See https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/crimeandjustice/articles/homicideinenglandandwales/ 
yearendingmarch2019#which-groups-of-people-were-most-likely-to-be-victims-of-homicide. 
21  See the article ‘Shock new figures fuel fears of more lockdown domestic abuse killings in UK’ by Mark Townsend in The 
Observer on 15 November 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/society/2020/nov/15/shock-new-figures-fuel-fears-
of-more-lockdown-domestic-abuse-killings-in-uk. 
22  See the article ‘Coronavirus: Domestic abuse an “epidemic beneath a pandemic”’, by June Kelly on 23 March 2021, 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-56491643. 
23  See the article ‘Fifth of crimes involved domestic abuse in first England and Wales lockdown’ by Jamie Grierson in The 
Guardian on 25 November 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/society/2020/nov/25/fifth-of-crimes-involved-
domestic-abuse-in-first-england-and-wales-lockdown. 
24  See the article ‘“Shadow pandemic” of violence against women to be tackled with $25m UN fund’, by Liz Ford in The 
Guardian on 25 November 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2020/nov/25/shadow-
pandemic-of-violence-against-women-to-be-tackled-with-25m-un-fund. 
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estimates that domestic violence cases increase by 15 million for every three months of 
lockdown.  
The domestic violence trends in lockdown highlight one of the most pernicious sources of gender 
inequality: men’s physical oppression of women. This also includes sexual assault and 
harassment that gained international attention with the #MeToo movement25 as allegations were 
made against high-profile men. Sexual violence and harassment are neither new nor confined to 
high-profile adults. A 2016 Parliamentary report concluded that sexual harassment has become a 
‘normal part of school life’ for UK school-age girls in particular (Women and Equalities 
Committee, 2016). It continues through higher education, with the Office for Students issuing new 
guidance26 in 2021 to address the problem of sexual harassment and the ‘rape culture’ at UK 
universities.27  
Harassment continues in the workplace, with 40% of UK women experiencing unwanted sexual 
behaviour despite laws banning it (Women and Equalities Committee, 2018a). Few victims make 
formal grievances within organisations for fear of retribution. Indeed, Wiggins and Browning 
(2019) reported that UK human resource personnel – the majority of whom are female28 – are 
charged with upholding the law, but often warn complainants that they would be branded as 
troublemakers if they proceed with their grievance. Even fewer victims take their allegations to 
an employment tribunal. One barrier is the potential legal costs for the individual, pitted against 
the greater resources of employers. Employers have also been known to threaten claimants that 
they will be sued for the employers’ legal costs (Women and Equalities Committee, 2018b). 
Despite the high costs, UK compensation awards are smaller than in other countries, according 
to a 2018 report to Parliament (Women and Equalities Committee, 2018a). For that report, the 
Equality and Human Rights Commission29 estimated that from 2017 to 2018, only 15 claims of 
sexual harassment or harassment related to sex were successful at final hearing, 30 were 
unsuccessful, and seven were withdrawn prior to the final hearing. Wiggins and Browning (2019) 
note that employers often demand that claimants sign non-disclosure agreements (NDA) when 
settling any type of sex discrimination claim prior to the hearing. NDAs limit public knowledge of 
the extent of gender discrimination and harassment, as well as the most frequent organisational 
perpetrators.  
In all, the UK’s institutional supports against gender violence, harassment and discrimination are 
inadequate in the best of circumstances. But it is not just the constant potential of men’s forceful 
oppression of women privately and publicly throughout their lives that sustains gender 
inequalities. The neverlution continues because of a vicious circle of socio-economic processes 
reinforcing gender hierarchies.  
 
 
25  See https://metoomvmt.org/get-to-know-us/history-inception/. 
26  See ‘Prevent and address harassment and sexual misconduct’, https://www.officeforstudents.org.uk/advice-and-
guidance/student-wellbeing-and-protection/prevent-and-address-harassment-and-sexual-misconduct/statement-
of-expectations/. 
27  See the article ‘English universities to be told to work harder to stop sexual misconduct’ by Rachel Hall and Richard 
Adams in The Guardian on 16 April 2021, https://www.theguardian.com/education/2021/apr/16/english-universities-
told-work-stop-sexual-misconduct-office-students. 
28  See https://www.xperthr.co.uk/news/female-hr-professionals-earn-11-less-than-men/156314/. 
29  See https://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-equalities-
committee/sexual-harassment-in-the-workplace/written/86429.html. 
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Self-reinforcing social and economic hierarchies 
In a widely cited article, sociologist Paula England (2010) concluded that gender equality remains 
elusive because of gender essentialism. Gender essentialism is a biological rather than socio-
cultural argument, wherein women and men are born with different and distinct natures and 
aptitudes. It is essentialist because all members of the category defined by biology are argued to 
share certain essential characteristics, fixed at birth, regardless of their socio-cultural 
surroundings.  
The difference in some aspects of women’s and men’s biology is essential to the species’ survival, 
at least until technology takes us to a ‘Brave New World’.30 Beyond that, the attitudinal and 
stereotype trends noted earlier indicate that people do not believe women’s and men’s 
characteristics are immutable. The writings associated with Raewyn Connell emphasise that 
what it means to be ideally feminine or masculine even for a given individual differs across time, 
situations and cultures (Messerschmidt et al., 2018). The problem is that these meanings 
invariably coalesce into a status hierarchy in industrial societies in which women are subordinate 
to men. Relative social status bestows relative power and desirability regardless of other 
resources. Consequently, characteristics considered masculine are valued more than those 
considered feminine. Status beliefs are the cultural foundation of all group inequalities, shaping 
expectations, actions and outcomes in daily interactions throughout our lives.  
Gender and other group inequalities are so resistant to change in industrial societies because 
status hierarchies become embedded in resource and power hierarchies. Feminist economist 
Heide Hartmann noted 40 years ago (Hartmann, 1981, p. 18) that ‘[c]apitalist development creates 
places for a hierarchy of workers, but… [g]ender and racial hierarchies determine who fills the 
empty places.’ Around the same time, Baron and Bielby (1980) pointed out that the process of 
allocating positions and associated resources does not occur in some abstract labour market, 
but within organisations such as firms, schools and government agencies. Neither organisations 
nor the processes are gender neutral. Joan Acker (1990) contends that organisations are 
inherently masculine by defining a universal, ideal worker as someone fully devoted to the job 
with no caring responsibilities or other outside distractions. The ideal worker model reinforces a 
division of paid and unpaid work, with women still primarily responsible for the latter. This fuels 
gender statistical discrimination, with employers viewing women as a group as less productive 
than men because they are all potential carers (Phelps, 1972). Glass ceilings and doors are most 
resistant to being broken because the expectation of work devotion is greatest for elite workers 
(Blair-Loy, 2005). In these ways, gender status hierarchies remain inseparable from the 
economic ones. 
At the same time, relative gender economic positions reinforce the status hierarchies. Ridgeway 
et al. (1998) showed in an innovative experiment that this process happens even when categorical 
distinctions are inconsequential. Participants were advised based on their responses to Klee and 
Kandinsky reproductions that they were type S2s or Q2s with no further specification of what the 
types indicated. They were also allocated either relatively lower or higher pay for participating in 
the experiment compared with their unseen, same-gender partner, who was a research 
confederate. The pair proceeded to engage via microphone in two series of discussions 
associating English words with a supposedly early language.  
When participants thought they were being paid less than the confederate, they deferred more to 
the confederate and this deference increased when the experiment was repeated. When 
 
 
30  See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bokanovsky%27s_Process. 
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participants thought they were being paid more, deference to the confederate was dramatically 
lower. Having greater resources therefore bestowed perceptions of greater mastery in social 
interactions, an inequality that participants viewed as legitimate whether they were advantaged 
or disadvantaged. Participants also generalised these perceptions of status and power to the 
entire world of fictitious S2s and Q2s.  
Therefore, socio-economic processes create a vicious circle of gender inequalities. Women’s 
relative social status puts them at a disadvantage in the organisational allocation of economic 
resources and power, and their relative level of economic resources and power reinforces their 
lower social status. In turn, the societal value of warmth, caring, gentleness and compassion is 
lessened because the traits are associated with women’s subordinate social status. Forcefulness, 
competitiveness and aggression are elevated in the social hierarchy as masculine traits. Because 
stereotypes are prescriptive as well as descriptive, women and men who veer too far from the 
stereotypical traits face both social and economic backlash (Rudman et al., 2012). With these 
strong socio-economic forces working against it, how can we possibly achieve gender equality?    
Dismantling inequalities 
To summarise, gender inequalities persist because they are constantly produced and reproduced 
simultaneously at the individual, interactional, organisational, national and global levels, via 
interlocking processes of physical, social, economic, legal and political oppression. More than 
their complexity makes them difficult to dismantle, however; the nature of the socio-economic 
processes leads the disadvantaged to accept the inequalities as legitimate even if they are not in 
their individual or collective best interests.  
Social psychologist John Jost (2019) contends system-justifying tendencies also come about 
because people are uncomfortable contemplating what radical change might bring. Instead, 
many opt for the devil they know. Those who challenge the status quo not only tolerate the 
uncertainty of the future, but also face possible social alienation for pushing against norms, and 
threats (e.g. when employers tell women that bringing discrimination or harassment suits will 
ruin their careers). Nonetheless, Jost believes change can happen if it is system-sanctioned, and 
if efforts avoid strident criticism of the status quo to avoid eliciting a threat response in defence of 
it.  
Dismantling gender inequalities therefore requires individual and collective bravery, coupled with 
a systemic, holistic but incremental approach. Change must be holistic in tackling each source of 
gender inequalities outlined above because of the reinforcing processes, but incremental to 
reduce the likelihood of strong threat reactions against change. The goals should also be 
realistic. It would be naïve to think that gender inequalities could be entirely eradicated, because 
it is human nature to make in-group and out-group distinctions (Tajfel, 2010). A more realistic 
goal is to work towards minimising gender differences in physical and economic security, 
achieved in part by encouraging nurturing and caring as shared rather than just feminine traits. I 
conclude with some examples of possible steps toward these goals in the UK by drawing on 
evidence from other countries.  
Political representation 
Women represent at least half of the UK electorate but are under-represented in Parliament. The 
introduction of gender electoral quotas is a positive-action strategy that seeks to rectify this by 
requiring that women make up a minimum percentage of reserved seats in an assembly, or 
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candidates in all political parties in a country (Hughes, Paxton and Krook, 2017). Individual political 
parties can also voluntarily decide to have a minimum number of female candidates. Small 
gender quotas have been around in other countries since the 1930s, but their adoption has grown 
rapidly since the 1990s and now half the countries in the world have some type of electoral 
gender quota.31  
Opponents of quotas argue that such positive action violates the principles of equality because 
they explicitly favour the currently disadvantaged groups, a stance enshrined in the UK’s Sexual 
Discrimination Act of 1975.32 Other opponents claim quotas promote unqualified individuals, 
although this assumes there are agreed qualifications for a politician beyond being a 
representative of some faction of the broader population. Supporters counter that quotas ensure 
public policy considers women’s concerns and assist qualified women in getting elected. 
UK political parties have used voluntary strategies for increasing female political representation 
since 1981, despite such strategies violating the ban on positive action in the Sexual 
Discrimination Act of 1975. In 2002, however, the Sex Discrimination (Election Candidates) bill33 
passed both stages of Parliament without a vote, which exempted any political party efforts to 
reduce gender inequality at any level of political office from the positive action limitations of the 
1975 Act. The bill was set to sunset in 2015, but the exemption was extended to 2030 under the 
Equality Act 2010.34 The percentage of women elected in the UK grew from less than 18% in 2002 
to 34% in the 2019 general election, with Labour having the greatest number of female MPs 
(Pilling and Cracknell, 2021).  
As noted earlier, however, growth in female political representation has been greater in other 
countries so that the UK fell in the global rankings across the period. One likely reason for this is 
that the UK efforts are voluntary political party strategies and not legislated quotas; the latter 
would violate the UK’s broader rejection of positive action. However, given the vicious cycle of 
reinforcing status and economic inequalities discussed earlier, it is difficult to see how gender 
equality could be reached without positive action to break the cycle. Nonetheless, all UK political 
parties could be more ambitious in setting their minimum quota of female candidates and offer 
more supports for their success.  
Benefits of equal female representation in national decision-making include cracking the glass 
ceiling and providing visible female leadership role models. The pandemic has also highlighted 
that female political leadership may be better suited to handling new global challenges. Female 
heads of government in countries such as Finland and New Zealand35 were seen as more 
effective at handling the first wave of the pandemic than the more macho leaders of countries 
such as Brazil and the US.36 In addition, Childs and Krook (2012) found that women elected to the 
UK Parliament through quotas felt more obligated to work for women than did non-quota 
women, so issues affecting women are more likely to be debated and championed. Political 
 
 
31  See the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, Gender Quotas Database, 
https://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/gender-quotas/quotas. 
32  See https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1975/65/enacted. 
33  See https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200102/cmbills/028/02028--a.htm. 
34  See https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/15/contents. 
35  See the article ‘Why are women-led nations doing better with Covid-19?’ in the New York Times, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/15/world/coronavirus-women-leaders.html. 
36  See the article ‘In this moment of crisis, macho leaders are a weakness, not a strength’ by Robin Dembroff in The 
Guardian on 13 April 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/apr/13/leaders-trump-bolsonaro-
coroanvirus-toxic-masculinity. 
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champions are needed to tackle the multiple sources of gender inequalities and provide the 
system support that makes successful change more likely.   
Organisations and anti-discrimination processes 
The atomistic economic models tested with microdata that dominate the literature have failed to 
fully explain persistent gender employment inequalities. What is needed instead is better 
understanding of the organisational processes structuring gender employment inequalities, 
because employment opportunities and wages are determined within firms, not labour markets. 
Not until 2017 did the UK government implement mandatory reporting37 of the gender pay gap in 
organisations with 250 or more employees, a mandate that was paused for 2019–20 because of 
the pandemic.38 After reporting, UK large organisations are left to their own devices to sort out 
the pay differentials with some generic guidance from the government.39 In addition, government 
statistics show that large private sector businesses cover just 40% of the private sector working 
population.40 It is unknown whether the gender wage gap is smaller, the same, or larger among 
the majority of UK private sector employees, and if the sources of the gap differ with organisation 
size.  
Furthermore, average organisational gender wage gaps do not reveal the specific processes 
causing them, which vary across both sectors and organisations. For example, the gender wage 
gap may be quite small in high-wage firms if only a handful of women get past the glass door to 
them. This means aggregate gender wage inequality is caused in part by how women and men 
sort across organisations as well as occupations, which is not something directly addressed in 
current legislation. It is also important to understand the reasons women are over-represented 
in lower-paying occupations and under-represented in higher-paying occupations within 
different types of firms and across sectors. Given UK women’s greater educational attainment, it 
is hard to believe these patterns reflect women’s lower skills. Finally, the litmus test for 
discrimination is if women are paid less than men when working in the same occupation and 
same firm.  
The only way to assess the prevalence of these various organisational sources of gender 
employment inequality is for the UK to provide panel data on employees nested in firms as 
gathered in administrative data in other countries. The Administrative Data Research UK (ADR 
UK)41 was set up to facilitate research using such data, but my own attempts to find the necessary 
data through ADR UK or the UK’s Government Equalities Office42 have not borne fruit. The UK 
would benefit from looking at how Statistics Finland43 has made such data available for research 
purposes. Finland’s centralised approach ensures both data availability and security issues can 
be addressed while granting remote access to the data to government and academic 
researchers. Only by fully understanding the organisational structure of gender employment 
inequalities in the UK can the government develop effective policy interventions to reduce them.  
 
 
37  See https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/gender-pay-gap-reporting. 
38  See https://www.gov.uk/government/news/employers-do-not-have-to-report-gender-pay-gaps. 
39  See https://gender-pay-gap.service.gov.uk/actions-to-close-the-gap?_ga=2.6821365.691460332.1607011724-
964570240.1606320171. 
40  See https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/business-population-estimates-2019. 
41  See https://www.adruk.org/. 
42  See https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/government-equalities-office. 
43  See https://www.stat.fi/tup/mikroaineistot/aineistot_en.html. 
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Relatedly, a UK commission with a mandate to monitor and power to enact organisational 
change to reduce gender discrimination and harassment is also needed. At present, the onus for 
organisational compliance is on individual women through internal grievance procedures or 
employment tribunals. Not only is this personally harrowing, but even successful individual 
claimants are often frustrated that their efforts do not change organisational practices for other 
women, according to those interviewed by Bloomberg (Wiggins and Browning, 2019).This is 
consistent with a US study that found that individual discrimination charges and settlements did 
not produce changes in the organisations directly charged (Hirsh, 2009). Instead, organisations 
were responsive only to regulatory and enforcement pressures brought to bear on their 
industrial sectors by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The EEOC was 
considered a ‘toothless tiger’ until granted litigation authority, although progress has since 
stalled and there are calls for a change in prosecutorial strategies.44 Therefore, bravery is needed 
not just from individuals speaking up within organisations, but also from UK politicians willing to 
put in place effective legal structures for monitoring and intervening to decrease workplace 
harassment and discrimination.  
Nudging nurturance to be a shared gender trait 
Gender inequalities will never be eliminated as long as the threat of violence and sexual assault 
against girls and women persists. It is argued that political and economic gender equalities are 
sources of female empowerment that can reduce gender violence in low- and medium-income 
countries. The correlation in high-income countries might be cause for worry. The Nordic 
countries are among those that have achieved the highest level of economic and political gender 
equality, as ranked by the United Nations Gender Inequality Index.45 A Nordic paradox is that 
these countries report higher levels of intimate partner violence and sexual assault against 
women than other European countries ranking lower on the equality index (Gracia and Merlo, 
2016).  
There are several possible reasons for the paradox. One possibility is that it is an artefact of 
Nordic women’s greater empowerment and voice that comes from equality policies. In other 
words, the true incidence of domestic violence may be no greater in the Nordic countries than in 
other countries; Nordic abuse victims are just more willing and able to report the violence. 
Greater reporting would then be an additional good outcome of equality policies, as hidden 
domestic violence cannot be addressed.  
If the incidence of domestic violence is actually higher in the Nordic countries, this could reflect a 
policy backlash relating to the lop-sided evolution in masculine and feminine stereotypes. The 
most extensive policy supports are for women to act more like men in terms of educational 
attainment and employment. From men’s perspective, these supports have doubled the number 
of competitors they face in the labour market compared with the 1960s when far fewer women 
were likely to be employed, especially after having children. These changes coincided with a shift 
from an industrial to post-industrial global economy. This shift eliminated good-paying 
manufacturing jobs for low-skilled men and instead grew the service sector and its need for the 
social skills associated with women. Consequently, most supports for gender equality to date 
could be viewed as threatening men’s employment identity. 
 
 
44  See http://eeolegalsolutions.com/the-eeocs-litigation-program-bureaucracy-not-real-reform/. 
45  See the latest Gender Inequality Index Data at http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/gender-inequality-index-gii. 
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What is needed are policies that equally encourage men to act more like women in order to give 
them larger life options, such as offering earnings-related, father-only parental leave.46 To date, 
only Iceland offers fathers the same length of parental leave as mothers, which was recently 
extended from 10 to 12 months for each parent.47 But even in Iceland as in other countries, 
fathers still take up only a fraction of total leave available (Eydal and Gíslason, 2019). Nevertheless, 
a comparative OECD study by Huerta et al. (2013) found that fathers who take parental leave are 
more likely to take an active role in childcare after they return to work. The longer the leave, the 
more equal the sharing of childcare. As noted at the outset of this commentary, male children in 
households where fathers do more domestic work grow up to do more. My expectation is that if 
policy encourages greater gender equality in nurturing within the family intergenerationally, it 
should slowly become a shared gender trait. If, that is, human men are as adaptive as male mice; 
neurobiologist Catherine Dulac has shown male mice exhibit the same nurturing genes as female 
mice when encountering the environmental stimulation to activate them.48  
This is a long-view proposal, but the UK has the least-generous family policies in Europe despite 
recent increases in support for fathers’ care work (Ray, Gornick and Schmitt, 2010). At present, 
the government provides two-weeks of flat-rate leave for new fathers that must be used in one go 
and within 56 days of the birth (Koslowski et al., 2020). The subsequent 18 weeks of fathers’ 
available parental leave is unpaid, with usage capped at four weeks per year. These policies are 
steps in the right direction, but campaigners have urged the UK government to scrap the current 
shared parental leave system because fathers’ take-up is so low, and to replace it with more 
generous and longer leaves for both parents.49 As the gender revolutionists foresaw, equalising 
men’s care work in the home supports women’s equal participation in public spheres. More 
profoundly, heightening men’s nurturance may devalue violence in the power hierarchy. That 
really would be revolutionary.  
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